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Book Review
Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction, Mario Bunge. Amherst, NY. Prometheus Books,
2001. ISBN: 1-57392-843-7. Indexes and bibliography. 7 line drawings. 245 pages.
In March, 1955, Professor Bunge published a review of Max Jammer’s Concepts of Space: the History of
Theories of Space in Physics. The review appeared in Imago Mundi, a journal that focused on the history
of culture and was under the editorial supervision of a distinguished group of scholars from Argentina. In
the review, Professor Bunge takes careful measure of Jammer’s work, finds it rather weak when dealing
with issues prior to the Seventeenth Century but rather helpful in sifting through problems related to
space as dealt with by scientists in more recent times.
Several issues related to this review are notable. The first is that even at the beginning of his career,
Professor Bunge was already displaying very broad horizons in the range of his learning while at
the same time recognizing the importance of system in the development of a perspective.
Another interesting coincidence is that a year later, in March, 1956 that same journal dedicated a
double issue to addressing the crisis not only in philosophy but in Western culture as a whole.
Perhaps Professor Bunge would find the articles in that 1956 venue somewhat lacking in rigor and
not as sensitive to systematic dimensions as would be desirable. Indeed the sense of crisis to which
the title of his book refers has a different focus than that used by the contributors to the March -
June, 1956 issue of Imago Mundi.
For Professor Bunge, the crisis in philosophy results from factual or theoretical errors or improper
formulation of issues, a certain lack of philosophy getting on with it. For philosophers to move out
of this crisis, they need to make sure they write and discuss in a clear fashion, make appropriate use
of formal tools and do their work based on the scientific knowledge that is available. Furthermore,
it is very important for philosophers to take their work seriously because they are in an excellent
position to address crucial, controverted issues in ways that can address problems fruitfully. For
him, philosophy is a necessity.
To undergird these efforts, Professor Bunge places his work within the context of a world view
defined by “a positive and broad” secular humanism (p.14). Several features of this humanism are
worth noting in order to make clear some of Professor Bunge’s basic commitments. With respect to
human beings: “The individual differences among people pale by comparison with the common
features that make us all members of the same species”(p. 16). With respect to values: “Although
different human groups may care for different values, there are many basic universal values, such as
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well being, honesty, loyalty, solidarity, fairness, security, peace, and knowledge, that are worth
working or even fighting for” (p.14). With respect to knowledge: “ It is possible to find out the
truth about the world and ourselves with the sole help of experience, reason, imagination, criticism
and action” (p. 14-15).
To work toward achieving this “trademark of secular humanism” and its “concern for the lot of
humankind,” (p.14) Professor Bunge insists that this be done by granting primacy of place to
“systemism” and to “the unity of all fields of scientific, technological, and humanistic research
beneath their obvious diversity” (p.43).
Embedded in these beginning points is philosophical materialism. To understand materialism
properly, one must accept that matter is inherently non-static or changing and that the defining
quality of the change is emergence. Thus, matter is not to be understood as something inert that is
out there, but as a systematic and ongoing arrangement of objects. This systematic arrangement
allows for the emergence of properties from a given set of objects such that those properties are not
properties of the objects themselves. This is far from a simple process since one must take into
consideration the composition, environment structure and mechanism operative in the system (p.
42).
From this base, everything that we want to consider from a philosophical perspective can be
appropriately understood or worked with. In this book, Professor Bunge explores in particular
issues related to human beings and human societies. These issues tend to be the most recalcitrant.
They resist being absorbed into a comfortable scientific methodology. He acknowledges that this
recalcitrance is justified in that the scientific procedures used to study these areas have been
inadequate. He claims, however, that if we understand science as it should be understood and if we
proceed on the assumption that everything that is real is a systematically structured emergent
material, then progress is at hand.
Much is to be gained from the discussions in this book about studies of humans as individuals and
as social beings. His emphasis on the need for clarity, even if every issue can’t be reduced to a
statement in symbolic logic, is helpful. His insistence that the elements of reality cannot be
understood apart from the context in which they occur is often overlooked. His affirmation about
the crucial role science has had in giving access to knowledge about ourselves and the world in
which we live needs underscoring.
However, Professor Bunge is more explicit and detailed than I have portrayed. Clarity for him
means that in the end what needs to be said theoretically should be stated in logical symbols in
order to make evident the logical relationships that hold between the theoretical statements.
Basically, there can be no theoretical conundrums – anywhere, at least eventually. There can be no
ambiguities inherent in reality.
Furthermore, his claim that every reality is a material reality accessible to experience or reason
raises questions. As he states it “all the furniture of the real world is material. The ‘worlds’ of
mathematics, philosophy, religion, and art are fictitious, and every fiction is a process in some
living brain” (p. 70). Professor Bunge tries to make this claim palatable by insisting that emergence
is an inherent dimension of matter. That is to say that something other than what is given may
emerge. In other words, the new can appear. One would even have to grant the possibility that one
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could create something new, as long as the something new was “a process in some living brain”
(p.70). If one were to be consistent, however, one would need to claim that the same must be true
of science, along with philosophy, religion, mathematics and art, since science, also, is basically “a
process in some living brain.” The problem with this approach is that in the end everything is
fictitious although one might want to hedge a bit and say some things are more fictitious than
others.
The quandary created by Professor Bunge’s approach is as follows. On the one hand, matter is
understood in a rather malleable way so as to include every new thing that emerges and should new
dimensions emerge that do not fit our understanding of matter, so much the better, because “there is
no reason to suppose that present day theories or matter are final” (p.64). This leaves one with a
gloriously expansive understanding of reality that for all its denials even includes Plato’s ideas
(while depriving them of external referents) and much more. On the other hand, all any of this
amounts to is “a process in a living brain” (p. 70). Is one to take this to mean that all brain
processes are the same? If so, there would seem to be little to discuss. If not, we are still at square
one, needing criteria that would distinguish one process from another such that in the end it is not
all fictitious.
Professor Bunge’s book has much to commend it: its generous humanism, its zeal for logical
clarity, its insistence on the importance of science as a source of knowledge, its attempt to
formulate an understanding of how we organize our facts and concepts. The only misgivings I have
are those elaborated above, plus a certain lack of clarity about how any given human being could
have a sense of identity that is more than a label.
William F. Cooper
Baylor University
